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ROSENFIELD v. GLOBALTRANZ: IS THE 
MANAGER RULE DEAD? THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT FAIR NOTICE IS 
THE APPROPRIATE TEST FOR WHETHER A 
MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE’S ACTIVITY IS 
PROTECTED UNDER THE FLSA 
Abstract: On December 14, 2015, in Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, 
Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the proper test 
for when an employee’s actions constituted a protected complaint under the 
anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) 
was whether the employer had fair notice that the actions were a complaint. In 
holding that the employee’s managerial status did not change the analytical 
framework, the Ninth Circuit diverged from previous rulings in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits that required 
managerial employees to assert adverse action against their employers to re-
ceive anti-retaliation protection. This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s 
use of a single test for both managerial and non-managerial employees is cor-
rect in that it allows for more robust enforcement of the FLSA, and is thus in 
keeping with Congress’ objective in passing the FLSA. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA” or “Act”) governs 
wage and hour standards for employees in both the public and private sec-
tors.1 Because the FLSA depends primarily on employee reporting for en-
forcement, it includes protections for employees who file complaints alleg-
ing violations of its provisions from retaliation by adverse employment ac-
tions.2 This protection from retaliation, however, has traditionally been in-
                                                                                                                           
 1 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012) (codifying protections for certain employees); Jonathan 
Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum Wage, 101 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 22, 22 (1978) (summarizing the functions of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”)). President Franklin Delano Roosevelt considered wage and hour protections a critical 
part of the New Deal, and the FLSA was the solution after the National Industrial Recovery Act’s 
labor standards were struck down along with its controls on trade practices. See A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) (striking down the industrial codes of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act as an “unconstitutional delegation of legislative power”); 
Grossman, supra, at 24 (discussing President Roosevelt’s opinion on labor standards and the New 
Deal). 
2 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); see Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 
11–12 (2011) (discussing the FLSA’s reliance on employee reports for enforcement). The ap-
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applicable when the complaining employee’s job responsibilities include 
oversight of wage and hour issues.3  
In 2015, in Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals for the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits and apply a “manager 
rule” to determine if an employee’s complaint constituted protected activity 
under the FLSA.4 Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that the proper inquiry for 
whether behavior constituted protected activity under the FLSA was a “fair 
notice” test based on the content and context of the action allowing the em-
ployer to recognize it as a protected complaint.5  
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision highlights the 
tension between the FLSA’s primary enforcement mechanism and its lack of 
protection for managers, and that it takes some steps in the right direction to 
reinforce the Act’s purpose but still leaves room for further action.6 Part I of 
                                                                                                                           
plicability of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation protection to internal complaints in addition to those filed 
in court or with the Department of Labor has been litigated in multiple U.S. Courts of Appeals, 
though the U.S. Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the issue. See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 16–
17 (resolving the question that oral complaints are protected under the FLSA in the context of a 
complaint made to an employer, but noting that whether a complaint made directly to an employer 
is protected was not briefed); Greathouse v. JHS Security Inc., 784 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(holding complaints made to employers are protected under the FLSA); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 
F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Valerio v. Putnam Assoc. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 
1999) (same); EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992) (same); EEOC v. 
White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Brock v. Richardson, 812 
F.2d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 1987) (same); Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 
1984) (same); Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975) (same); Jen-
nifer Clemons, FLSA Retaliation: A Continuum of Employee Protection, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 535, 
541–48 (2001) (discussing what constitutes an FLSA complaint in various circuits). 
 3 See McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486–87 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
managers must step outside their roles as company representatives for activity to constitute a pro-
tected complaint under the FLSA); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in the EEO Office, 50 TULSA L. 
REV. 1, 16–17, 24 (2014) (discussing how the manager rule can bar claims brought by people 
acting within their assigned work responsibilities in both the FLSA and Title VII context). But see 
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (establishing retaliation protection when employees file complaints). 
 4 See John E. Sanchez & Robert D. Klausner, Prohibited Employee Acts, STATE & LOCAL 
EMPLOYMENT LIABILITY § 3:15 (2016) (identifying a circuit split between the Ninth Circuit’s 
adoption of fair notice as established in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., and 
the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits’ use of the manager rule). Compare Rosenfield v. Glob-
alTranz Enters., Inc., 811 F.3d 282, 287 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a fair notice test applies 
regardless of managerial status), with Pettit v. Steppingstone, Ctr. for the Potentially Gifted, 429 
F. App’x 524, 530 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2011) (adopting the manager rule), Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, 
L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 627–28 (5th Cir. 2008) (same), Claudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickinson Caribe, 
Ltd., 375 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2004) (same), and McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486–87 (establishing the 
manager rule for determining when a managerial employee’s behavior is protected action under 
the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision). 
 5 Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14 (establishing the fair notice test for FLSA complaints); Rosenfield, 
811 F.3d at 287 (adopting the Kasten test). 
 6 See infra notes 13–133 and accompanying text. 
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this Comment presents an overview of the FLSA, its provisions, and en-
forcement mechanisms.7 It then reviews the development of the manager 
rule for identifying protected activity.8 Part I also discusses the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s establishment of the “fair notice test” used by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Rosenfield and reviews the factual and procedural history of Rosen-
field.9 Part II examines and discusses the Ninth Circuit’s Rosenfield deci-
sion and how it differs from prior decisions by the First, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Tenth Circuits.10 Part III argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision points to 
the inherent tension between the FLSA’s reliance on employee complaints 
for enforcement and its lack of protection for the very employees charged 
with monitoring FLSA matters.11 It argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
lays the groundwork for progress to ameliorate this issue and strengthen the 
FLSA’s primary enforcement mechanism.12 
I. THE FLSA AND MANAGERIAL COMPLAINTS 
The FLSA revolutionized American labor.13 It established the forty-hour 
workweek, set the first federal minimum wage, codified “time and a half” for 
certain kinds of overtime, and prohibited most child labor.14 Section A of this 
Part presents an overview of the FLSA’s protections, exemptions, and en-
forcement methods.15 Section B examines the judicial development of the 
manager rule by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.16 Section C 
outlines the fair notice test established by the U.S. Supreme Court.17 Section 
D discusses the factual and procedural history of Rosenfield.18 
A. The FLSA’s Protections, Exemptions, and Enforcement 
Employees covered by the FLSA may file complaints if they believe 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See infra notes 13–67 and accompanying text.  
 8 See infra notes 29–43 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 44–67 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 68–91 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 92–133 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 92–133 and accompanying text. 
 13 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012) (codifying protections for certain employees); Grossman, 
supra note 1, at 22, 25 (discussing labor law history prior to the FLSA and the intention that the 
FLSA guarantee fair pay for fair working conditions). 
 14 See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (regulating minimum wage); id. § 207 (regulating maximum hours and 
overtime compensation); id. § 212 (regulating child labor in interstate commerce); Compliance 
Assistance—Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://
www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/ [https://perma.cc/JBP8-GKM3] (discussing FLSA provisions). 
 15 See infra notes 19–28 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 29–43 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 44–53 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 54–67 and accompanying text. 
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their pay or time on the clock is being calculated incorrectly.19 The FLSA 
protects those who file such complaints from retaliation as a result of their 
actions.20 Retaliation includes discharge or other discrimination against the 
employee.21 
Certain job duties are deemed exempt from the FLSA such that em-
ployees above a certain salary floor who perform these duties are not sub-
ject to the FLSA’s wage and hour requirements.22 Managerial duties are ex-
empt from protection under the FLSA.23 Whether a managerial employee 
may make an internal complaint about wage and hour issues under the 
FLSA and subsequently be protected from retaliation for that action is 
somewhat ambiguous.24 
The FLSA has a variety of enforcement mechanisms, including gov-
ernment investigations, administrative processes, civil litigation, and crimi-
nal prosecution.25 The Wage & Hour Division of the Department of Labor 
                                                                                                                           
 19 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (establishing minimum wage and maximum hours regulations). 
 20 Id. § 215(a)(3). Employees who cause complaints to be filed by someone else on their be-
half or who testify in proceedings about wage and hour violations are also protected. Id. The 
FLSA’s protections apply to employees involved in interstate commerce or the production of goods 
for interstate commerce, employees who work in hospitals and schools, and most state and federal 
government employees. Id. § 203(e) (establishing who is protected by the FLSA). Certain occupa-
tions—agricultural workers and railroad workers, among others—are not covered by the FLSA 
but by other statutes. Id. § 213 (exempting certain occupations); see id. § 213(a)(6) (exempting 
agricultural workers); id. § 213(b)(2)–(3) (exempting railway workers); Migrant and Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1872 (2012) (providing wage and hour 
protections to agricultural workers); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2012) (governing 
labor relations for railroad and airline workers). 
 21 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (protecting employees from discharge and “any other manner [of] 
discriminat[ion]”). 
 22 Id. § 213(a)(1) (exempting categories of employees from FLSA wage-and-hour protec-
tions). 
 23 See id. (exempting “bona fide executive, administrative, or professional” employees). Ex-
empt primary duties include “executive,” “professional,” and “administrative” activities. Id. “Ex-
ecutive” duties are management of at least some subset of the enterprise, supervision of other 
employees, and hiring and firing powers. 29 C.F.R. § 541.100 (2016). The Department of Labor 
considers “administrative” duties to be office work relating to the employer’s general business 
operation or customers that include exercising discretion and independent judgment for important 
issues. Id. § 541.200. “Professional” duties include work that is primarily intellectual and that 
requires advanced knowledge “in a field of science or learning,” where the work calls for con-
sistent exercise of judgment and discretion. Id. § 541.300. The salary floor, setting the minimum 
point at which employees performing executive, administrative, or professional duties are exempt 
from the FLSA’s wage and overtime requirements, is $913 per week. Id. § 541.600. Though these 
job duties are exempt from the FLSA’s minimum wage protections, they are still covered by the 
equal pay provisions in § 206(d). 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d), 213(a). 
 24 See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (establishing retaliation protection when employees file com-
plaints); Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 286 (discussing when the same statements by managerial and 
non-managerial employees may not trigger the same recognition as protected complaints under 
§ 215(a)(3)). 
25 Handy Reference Guide to the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.
dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/hrg.htm [https://perma.cc/U5T8-LDJ9] (discussing FLSA enforce-
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employs investigators, who research company behaviors and enforce the 
FLSA directly, but many FLSA violations only come to light via employee 
complaints.26 Because these violations would remain unknown to the gov-
ernment absent employee whistleblowing, the FLSA must offer protection 
from retaliation if it is to successfully depend on employee-driven compli-
ance.27 To minimize an employee’s fear of economic reprisal, the anti-
retaliation provision allows for compensatory and occasionally punitive 
damages to be awarded to harmed employees should an employer take an 
adverse employment action in response to a protected activity.28 
                                                                                                                           
ment mechanisms). Willful FLSA violations can be criminally prosecuted; penalties include fines 
for a first conviction and imprisonment for a second conviction. Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T OF LA-
BOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/youthlabor/enforcement [http://web.archive.org/web/2017
0225043218/https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/youthlabor/enforcement/]. 
 26 See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (holding that Con-
gress made a deliberate choice in establishing an enforcement process based not on detailed feder-
al supervision but rather on employee complaints, and that FLSA enforcement can only be effec-
tive if employees are comfortable coming forward with such complaints); Jessica Barclay-Strobel, 
Comment, Shooting the Messenger: How Enforcement of FLSA and ERISA Is Thwarted by 
Courts’ Interpretations of the Statutes’ Antiretaliation and Remedies Provisions, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 521, 552 (2010) (discussing the employee’s role in FLSA enforcement); Enforcement, supra 
note 25 (explaining that willful violation of the FLSA may subject an employer to criminal as well 
as civil sanctions). In 2001, there were only 900 Department of Labor investigators nationwide. 
Scott D. Miller, Revitalizing the FLSA, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 31 (2001) (discussing 
FLSA investigators). 
 27 See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (protecting employees who bring FLSA complaints from adverse 
employment action); Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292 (discussing the importance of employee economic 
stability in FLSA enforcement); Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, Collective Coercion, 57 B.C. 
L. REV. 1599, 1604–05 (2016) (discussing law’s purpose to protect people from coercion); Bar-
clay-Strobel, supra note 26, at 523 (discussing the general reliance on employee reporting to iden-
tify employer violations and enforce the FLSA). The Court in Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewel-
ry, Inc. viewed the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA as a purposeful congressional effort to 
foster a climate in which employees did not fear economic reprisal for voicing concerns about 
FLSA violations, thereby furthering the power of the Act’s substantive provisions. 361 U.S. at 
292. 
 28 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a)–(c), (e) (establishing compensatory and punitive damages for viola-
tions of the FLSA anti-retaliation provision); Barclay-Strobel, supra note 26, at 523 (discussing 
employee role in FLSA enforcement). An adverse employment action typically occurs when an 
employer makes a “materially adverse change” to an employee’s job, whether it be to wages, 
hours, benefits, or responsibilities. Peter M. Panken, Retaliation: The New Tsunami in Employ-
ment Litigation, ALI-CLE COURSE MATERIALS (section IV Adverse Employment Action) (2015), 
Westlaw TSWU21 ALI-CLE 71. The Supreme Court has developed a standard of materiality for 
Title VII anti-retaliation protection where the retaliatory action must be enough to deter a reasona-
ble employee from filing a complaint. Id. Under the FLSA, retaliatory actions taken by employers 
have included demotion, failure to promote, transfer, and termination of employees. Clemons, 
supra note 2, at 540. 
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B. Development of the “Manager Rule” in the First, Fifth,  
Sixth, and Tenth Circuits 
To engage in protected activity under the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provi-
sion, an employee must file a complaint alleging a violation of the Act.29 
The general consensus among the U.S. Courts of Appeals—and the implicit 
suggestion from the Supreme Court—is that complaints alleging FLSA vio-
lations may be filed either internally, with the employer, or externally in the 
courts or with the Department of Labor and its agencies.30 For enforcement 
of the FLSA’s substantive provisions to be effective, and for the anti-
retaliation provision to have real meaning, courts have ruled that protected 
complaints must include those made internally to employers as well as ex-
ternally to courts or agencies.31 The question then becomes whether an em-
ployee’s position within the company determines what constitutes sufficient 
action to register as a protected internal complaint.32  
In 1996, in McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit first developed the “manager rule” for evaluating 
whether activity by a managerial employee is protected under the FLSA’s 
anti-retaliation provision.33 The Tenth Circuit held that the required hall-
                                                                                                                           
 29 See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (triggering anti-retaliation protection when an “employee has 
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this 
chapter”). 
 30 See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 17 (holding complaints made to employers valid under the FLSA); 
Greathouse, 784 F.3d at 114 (same); Lambert, 180 F.3d at 1001 (same); Valerio, 173 F.3d at 41 
(same); Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d at 989 (same); White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d at 1011 
(same); Brock, 812 F.2d at 125 (same); Love, 738 F.2d at 387 (same); Brennan, 513 F.2d at 181 
(same). There is some lingering debate over whether complaints to employers should be protected 
by the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision, and some would prefer, based on their understanding of 
statutory construction, to wait for the Supreme Court to definitively rule on the question. See Kas-
ten, 563 U.S. at 26 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Greathouse, 784 F.3d at 125–27 (Korman, J., dissent-
ing). The Ninth Circuit has recognized internal and external complaints as entitled to FLSA pro-
tection. See Lambert, 180 F.3d at 1004–05 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)) (holding that the anti-
retaliation provision’s protections are undermined if complaints to employers are excluded). 
 31 See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 12 (holding that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision renders the 
enforcement scheme effective and that it does not make sense for Congress to undercut this by 
limiting complaints to those only in writing); Lambert, 180 F.3d at 1004 (holding that for the anti-
retaliation provision to work properly, complaints made to employers must be protected). 
 32 See McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486–87 (considering whether a personnel director’s behavior 
constituted a protected internal complaint and establishing the manager rule). 
 33 Id. (establishing the manager rule); see Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 287 (calling McKenzie v. 
Renberg’s Inc.’s approach the “manager rule”). Ms. McKenzie was employed as the personnel 
director, and her responsibilities included monitoring compliance with state and federal employment 
laws. McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1481. After receiving informational material from a coworker who had 
attended a wage and hour seminar, Ms. McKenzie became concerned that the company was not 
properly compensating certain employees. Id. She discussed her concerns with the company’s 
attorney and president, and was fired sixteen days later. Id. At a jury trial for retaliatory discharge 
under the FLSA and state law, the jury returned a special interrogatory finding that her termination 
was retaliation for her report of potential FLSA violations. Id. at 1483. The district court, however, 
272 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:E. Supp. 
mark of protected activity is the assertion of statutory rights by taking ac-
tion that is somehow “adverse to the company.”34 In McKenzie, the plaintiff, 
who was the company’s personnel director, informed the company attorney 
and president of possible FLSA violations.35 Her actions in raising the po-
tential violations were in keeping with her direct responsibilities to monitor 
company compliance with labor laws.36 She did not step outside her role or 
threaten to file an external complaint on either her own or other employees’ 
behalf, so the court held that she did not engage in protected activity under 
the anti-retaliation provision.37 To trigger the protections of § 215(a)(3), the 
plaintiff needed to actively assert the FLSA’s statutory rights by doing some-
thing more than just fulfilling her responsibilities as personnel director.38  
The First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have similarly adopted this manag-
er rule.39 The Fifth Circuit explained the policy reasoning behind its adop-
tion of the rule: it made sense for a manager to be forced to step outside his 
                                                                                                                           
approved the employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the FLSA retaliation claim, 
and Ms. McKenzie appealed. Id. 
 34 McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486 (discussing when protected FLSA activity occurs). The Tenth 
Circuit reached this adverse action requirement by drawing from its previous decision in 1984 in 
Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., where it held that FLSA protection applied to “unofficial assertions 
of rights through complaints at work.” Id. (quoting Love, 738 F.2d at 387). In Love, the Tenth 
Circuit cited Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., for the protection of good faith assertions of statu-
tory rights, which interpreted the language of § 213(a)(3) as protecting assertions, actual or threat-
ened, of FLSA rights. See Love, 738 F.2d at 387; Brennan, 513 F.2d at 180. The McKenzie court 
interpreted this assertion of statutory rights to require action adverse to the employer. McKenzie, 
94 F.3d at 1486. Because the plaintiff was within her usual job responsibilities when she reported 
her FLSA compliance concerns to her management, she did not sufficiently assert the statutory 
rights necessary to trigger anti-retaliation protection. Id. at 1487. 
 35 McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1481 (discussing plaintiff’s actions). 
 36 See id. at 1487 (finding no protected FLSA activity). Ms. McKenzie would have had to file 
or threaten to file a complaint directly with the Department of Labor or in court for her actions to 
be considered adverse and accorded anti-retaliation protection. Id. at 1486–87. Had an employee 
without responsibility for FLSA compliance gone to Ms. McKenzie’s management with the same 
concerns that she raised, that employee’s actions would be adverse and protected as outside their 
assigned responsibilities. See id. at 1487 (discussing the importance of Ms. McKenzie’s profes-
sional responsibilities in determining the parameters of adverse action). 
 37 Id. at 1486–87. Because plaintiff as personnel director had not engaged in behavior protect-
ed by the FLSA when she raised concerns about compliance, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the employer. Id. 
 38 Id.; see also Mark J. Oberti, New Wave of Employment Retaliation and Whistleblowing, 38 
T. MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 45–47 (2012) (discussing increasing use of the manager rule in connec-
tion with the concern about maintaining at-will employment practices for employees charged with 
FLSA compliance matters). 
 39 See Pettit, 429 F. App’x at 530 n.2 (noting that various Sixth Circuit district courts had held 
that a complaint was only protected when it was outside the employee’s usual responsibilities); 
Hagan, 529 F.3d at 627–28 (agreeing with McKenzie that a managerial employee must assert 
adverse action against the employer to file a protected complaint under the anti-retaliation provi-
sion of the FLSA); Claudio-Gotay, 375 F.3d at 102 (holding that because the employee directly 
stated his intention to protect the company when he reported FLSA violations, he did not assert 
any rights against his employer that were entitled to anti-retaliation protection). 
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or her usual role to file a protected complaint, because a managerial role 
necessarily involved reporting the concerns of other employees.40 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was particularly concerned that allow-
ing managerial employees to be protected from retaliation under the FLSA 
for raising compliance concerns within their normal job responsibilities 
could turn the employee’s entire course of conduct into protected activity.41 
To differentiate between these usual job responsibilities and FLSA-
protected complaints and maintain a robust concept of at-will employment, 
it was necessary to use a different method to analyze the behavior of mana-
gerial employees.42 Under the manager rule, employees’ specific work re-
sponsibilities thus determined whether their internal complaints about wage 
and hour issues were protected from retaliation: an employee with responsi-
bility for FLSA matters would only be protected when asserting an action 
adverse to the employer, whereas an employee without such responsibilities 
would be protected for internally raising concerns.43 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Hagan, 529 F.3d at 628 (discussing policy support for the manager rule). The court in Ha-
gan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C. was concerned that if regular managerial behavior were enough 
to constitute protected action, there would be little distinction between regular employment activi-
ties and FLSA-protected ones. Id. The Fifth Circuit implied that the McKenzie manager rule’s 
requirement of adverse action may be tied to the language of § 215(a)(3), making it unlawful to 
discharge someone “because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be 
instituted any proceeding.” See id. at 623 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)). Nevertheless, the court 
was more focused on the policy behind the rule than its statutory basis. See id. at 628; Barclay-
Strobel, supra note 26, at 533 (discussing the circuit courts’ focus on the manager rule’s practical 
grounds and implications for at-will employment). The manager rule has been imported into other 
areas of law. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) (applying managerial considera-
tions in deciding whether employee speech was protected under the First Amendment); Brush v. 
Sears Holdings Corp., 466 F. App’x 781, 786 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying a manager rule in a Title 
VII discrimination retaliation case); Brake, supra note 3, at 19–20, 24 (discussing the adoption of 
the manager rule in cases beyond FLSA retaliation and how its application to Title VII cases can 
compromise effective anti-discrimination enforcement because of the difficulty in separating ad-
verse action from normal job performance). It has, however, begun to receive pushback in the 
field of Title VII jurisprudence. See DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 422 (4th Cir. 
2015) (holding that the manager rule did not apply to Title VII cases because of its broader statu-
tory language when compared with the FLSA). 
 41 Hagan, 529 F.3d at 628. 
 42 See id. (discussing the need for an at-will employee to remain dischargeable without a 
constant fear of litigation). 
 43 See McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1487 (discussing how the parameters of adverse and thus protect-
ed action are determined by an employee’s responsibilities for wage and hour issues); Barclay-
Strobel, supra note 26, at 525–26 (discussing the different protections accorded to managerial 
employees in circuits with and without the manager rule). 
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C. The Supreme Court’s Formulation of a “Fair Notice” Test for  
Protected Activity Under the FLSA 
For courts that allow FLSA protection of internal as well as external 
complaints, the next dispute has been how much formality is required for an 
internal complaint to register as such and trigger statutory anti-retaliation 
protection.44 In 2011, in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the formality of complaint re-
quired to trigger protection under the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.45 
The Supreme Court considered whether oral as well as written complaints 
were covered by the FLSA’s statutory language, and adopted a broad view 
of what constitutes protected behavior under the anti-retaliation provision.46 
The Supreme Court held that the Act must be interpreted to include oral as 
well as written complaints to avoid undermining the FLSA’s essential objec-
tive to protect vulnerable employees from accepting substandard work con-
ditions for fear of economic reprisal.47  
Rather than adopting a bright-line rule for what constitutes a complaint 
under the FLSA, the Supreme Court held that the primary concern was 
whether the employer had fair notice that an action was a complaint under 
the FLSA.48 The “content and context” of the employee’s statements, 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012) (establishing retaliation protection for employees who 
“file any complaint”); Kasten, 563 U.S. at 4 (considering whether oral as well as written com-
plaints are protected under FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision); Greathouse, 784 F.3d at 107 (con-
sidering whether internal complaints to employers are protected under FLSA’s anti-retaliation 
provision). 
 45 Kasten, 563 U.S. at 4.  
 46 Id. (adopting a broad view of protected behavior). The Court did not address the other un-
derlying question present in the case and subject to a circuit split before Kasten: whether an inter-
nal complaint counts as protected activity, or if the complaint must be made externally to the gov-
ernment. See id. at 17; Lawrence D. Rosenthal, The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act’s Anti-Retaliation Provision in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corporation: Putting Policy Over Plain Language?, 64 MERCER L. REV. 459, 460 (2013). The 
Court refused to consider the internal/external complaint question because it was not raised in the 
certiorari briefs and because it did not consider it “predicate to the intelligent resolution” of the 
primary question. Kasten, 563 U.S. at 17. Part of the Court’s rationale for why oral complaints 
must be included in a proper interpretation of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision, however, was 
the idea that a limited reading of the statutory language would prevent the furthering of FLSA 
compliance through use of informal workplace reporting procedures. Id. at 13. This statement 
seems to implicitly support the idea that internal complaints are thus acceptable for the purposes 
of the anti-retaliation provision. See id. In his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia noted that the majori-
ty’s holding is nonsensical if internal complaints are not within the ambit of the anti-retaliation 
provision. Id. at 26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 47 Kasten, 563 U.S. at 11 (including oral as well as written complaints). Because the statute 
says “filed any complaint,” the Court held that the FLSA is not restricted to only formal written 
complaints. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); Kasten, 563 U.S. at 10, 17. 
 48 See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14 (holding that the employer’s fair notice of an FLSA complaint is 
the determining factor for when action constitutes a complaint with anti-retaliation protection, 
because the FLSA’s basic objective is to protect employees); L. Camille Hébert, The Supreme 
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whether oral or written, needed to be enough for a reasonable employer to 
recognize the action as an “assertion of rights” under the FLSA.49 The 
Court reached this conclusion after in-depth consideration of the FLSA’s 
language, which grants protection to those who have “filed any complaint,” 
the Congressional intent and basic objectives of the FLSA, and the Depart-
ment of Labor’s historical treatment of the provision’s scope.50 Requiring 
specific written formalities would discourage informal mechanisms de-
signed to improve FLSA enforcement and protect workers with limited time 
or ability to generate written complaints, undermining the Act’s remedial 
purpose.51 The Court found the employer’s notice of a complaint to be more 
important than the specific formality of its delivery because knowledge of a 
complaint is necessary before there can be discrimination because of it.52 
Though the specific question before the Court was whether oral as well as 
written complaints could be protected from retaliation under the FLSA, the 
Court’s holding established a general baseline for determining when a com-
plaint receives anti-retaliation protection.53 
                                                                                                                           
Court’s 2010–2011 Labor and Employment Law Decisions: A Large and “Mixed Bag” for Em-
ployers and Employees, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 279, 292–93 (2011) (asserting that a broad 
understanding of protected FLSA complaints is consistent with both the text and purpose of the 
FLSA). 
 49 See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14 (reasoning that fair notice is the necessary hallmark for a pro-
tected FLSA complaint because an employer without knowledge of the complaint cannot discrim-
inate because of it). Because the district court and the Seventh Circuit granted and then affirmed 
summary judgment in the employer’s favor on the grounds that oral complaints were not protected 
by the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision, the Supreme Court did not address whether Mr. Kasten’s 
actual behavior constituted a protected complaint under their construction of a fair notice test. Id. 
at 6, 17. Rather, the Court remanded the case for consideration of whether Mr. Kasten did in fact 
make a protected complaint. Id. at 17. The Court therefore did not elaborate on what considera-
tions should be taken into account when evaluating the context or content of a complaint, implicit-
ly leaving that determination to the lower courts as well. See id. at 14, 17. 
 50 Id. at 7–16. The Court found that the phrase “filed any complaint” in its entirety allowed 
for the possibility of oral complaints, but was insufficiently definite to answer the question. Id. at 
11. The Court further found that excluding oral complaints from anti-retaliation protection would 
undermine the FLSA’s basic objective to protect workers and defeat Congress’s intent for em-
ployee reporting to serve as a substantial component of FLSA enforcement, especially given liter-
acy rates when the FLSA was passed. Id. at 11–12. The Court also considered the Department of 
Labor’s traditional inclusion of oral complaints within the phrase “filed any complaint” deserving 
of weight. Id. at 14–15. 
 51 Id. at 12–13; see also Matthew T. Bodie, The Roberts Court and the Law of Human Re-
sources, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 159, 195 (2013) (discussing how the Court’s inclusion 
of oral complaints within anti-retaliation protection facilitates internal human resources complaint 
systems). 
 52 Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14. 
 53 Id. After establishing this baseline, the Court then stated that it could be satisfied by both 
written and oral complaints. Id.; see also Eric Schnapper, Review of Labor and Employment Law 
Decisions from the United States Supreme Court’s 2010–2011 Term, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
329, 353 (2012) (discussing the broad test for protected complaints generated by Kasten). 
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D. Factual and Procedural History of Rosenfield v.  
GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc. 
In May 2011, Alla Josephine Rosenfield was employed by Global-
Tranz Enterprises, Inc. as the Director of Human Resources and Corporate 
Training.54 Ms. Rosenfield believed that she was not responsible for ensur-
ing the company’s compliance with FLSA obligations.55 In the course of her 
assigned duties, however, she discovered FLSA violations that she then re-
peatedly brought to the attention of her management.56 
Though her boss was frustrated by Ms. Rosenfield’s insistence that 
GlobalTranz address these violations, he agreed to take steps to make the 
company legally compliant.57 Ms. Rosenfield felt that he was very clear that 
she should not continue to pursue the matter, nor take it upon herself to en-
sure that GlobalTranz actually became compliant with the FLSA.58  
Despite her sense that she was not expected to monitor the company’s 
FLSA compliance, Ms. Rosenfield learned that GlobalTranz had not made 
the necessary changes to become FLSA compliant after conducting a re-
quired exit interview.59 Shortly thereafter, Ms. Rosenfield visited a compa-
                                                                                                                           
54 Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 285. Ms. Rosenfield was initially hired in April 2010 as Manager of 
Human Resources and promoted to Director of Human Resources before assuming the role she 
held at her dismissal in May 2011. Id. 
 55 Id. at 288 (discussing plaintiff’s job responsibilities). Ms. Rosenfield was instructed by her 
management to disengage from FLSA compliance matters and avoid involvement with such is-
sues. First Amended Complaint at 5, Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-02327-
PHX-NVW (D. Ariz. Jan. 30, 2012). Ms. Rosenfield and the court acknowledged that FLSA re-
sponsibilities are a natural job responsibility for a human resources manager, but Ms. Rosenfield 
understood FLSA compliance to be solely within her manager’s purview. Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 
288.  
 56 Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 288. Ms. Rosenfield learned of these violations through information 
available due to her position as Manager and Director of Human Resources and through inter-
views with GlobalTranz employees. First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, at 4, 10–11. On 
eight separate occasions, Ms. Rosenfield made oral complaints about the FLSA violations to her 
management. Opening Brief of Appellants at 35, Rosenfield, 811 F.3d 282 (No. 13-15292). She 
also included the violations in her weekly summaries to upper management on at least twenty-
seven occasions. Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 288. These FLSA violations included misclassifying 
hourly employees as salaried to avoid paying overtime and failing to pay equal compensation to 
men and women performing the same jobs. First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, at 4, 6. One 
of the most significant amendments to the FLSA was the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which prohibits 
sex-based discrimination and requires employers to provide equal pay for equal work. Equal Pay 
Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)). 
 57 First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, at 9 (establishing the facts of the case). 
58 Id. at 5 (establishing the facts of the case). After raising her initial concerns about FLSA 
violations, Ms. Rosenfield was required to submit a weekly summary of her work to validate her 
role at the company. Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 56, at 18 n.2. No other GlobalTranz 
employees were subject to this reporting requirement. Id. 
 59 Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 56, at 8–9 (establishing the facts of the case). The 
departing employee said he had not been paid overtime, despite management’s indications that 
company practices had been brought in line with the FLSA’s requirements. Id. at 8. 
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ny call center to investigate another employee complaint.60 She learned that 
employees were instructed to document that they had only worked eight 
hours per day, when in fact they had worked longer.61 Ms. Rosenfield re-
ported this non-compliance to her boss on May 26, 2011.62 Five days later, 
he fired her.63 
In response to her termination, Ms. Rosenfield filed suit in 2011 in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against GlobalTranz and its 
executives.64 She alleged that her dismissal was a response to her com-
plaints about the company’s FLSA violations, which she considered pro-
tected activity under the FLSA, and thus a violation of the FLSA’s anti-
retaliation provision.65 The district court acknowledged that Ms. Rosenfield 
had repeatedly advocated for FLSA compliance on behalf of GlobalTranz’s 
employees, but held that her action was not protected by the FLSA’s anti-
retaliation provision because she had not “filed any complaint” as statutori-
ly required.66 The district court therefore granted summary judgment in 
GlobalTranz’s favor on the FLSA retaliation claim.67 
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT TAKES A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO MANAGERIAL 
ACTIVITY IN ROSENFIELD V. GLOBALTRANZ ENTERPRISES, INC. 
 In 2015, in Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether a managerial em-
ployee’s activity constituted a protected FLSA complaint using the test ar-
ticulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2011 in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Per-
formance Plastics Corp., rather than the manager test established by other 
circuits.68 Section A of this Part discusses the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning for 
adopting the Kasten fair notice test, its preliminary application, and the de-
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id. at 9. 
 61 Id. at 9–10. 
 62 Id. at 10. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 285. 
 65 Id. (discussing the original claims of the case). Ms. Rosenfield also filed Arizona state law 
claims, which she later voluntarily dismissed. Id. 
 66 Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-02327-PHX-NVW, 2012 WL 
12538605, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2012). The district court maintained that a managerial employee 
could not engage in protected activity under the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision while acting 
within her responsibilities as a manager. Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 14 (2011) (establishing 
the fair notice rule for FLSA complaints); Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., 811 F.3d 282, 
287 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that the fair notice rule preempted the manager rule). 
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parture from the approach of the other U.S. Courts of Appeals.69 Section B 
of this part considers the Rosenfield dissent.70 
A. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s Analysis 
The primary question before the court on appeal was whether a differ-
ent standard applied to determining whether a complaint is protected under 
the FLSA when filed by a manager as opposed to a non-managerial em-
ployee.71 Rather than adopting a categorical rule based on an employee’s 
managerial role, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the particular facts surrounding 
the manager’s complaint under the Supreme Court’s Kasten fair notice 
test.72 The fair notice test states that the “content and context” of a com-
plaint must be recognizable to a reasonable employer as an assertion of 
statutory FLSA rights.73 Under this analysis, Ms. Rosenfield’s status as a 
manager was an important part of the context of her action but did not re-
quire a separate analytical framework.74 
The court recognized that the FLSA might offer disparate protections 
to wage and hour concerns raised by managerial employees and identical 
comments made by non-managerial employees.75 If the manager making the 
statements was responsible for ensuring FLSA compliance, the court found 
that it would be perfectly reasonable for the employer not to recognize her 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See infra notes 71–87 and accompanying text. 
 70 See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 71 Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 285 (“We must next consider when a manager, as opposed to a non-
managerial employee, has ‘filed any complaint’ under § 215(a)(3).”). The Ninth Circuit first con-
cluded that Ms. Rosenfield satisfied the statutory definition of an employee under the FLSA such 
that the anti-retaliation provision was applicable. Id. The FLSA’s definition of an “employee” is 
broad, encompassing anyone who works for an employer without reference to managerial status or 
lack thereof. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012); Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 285. 
 72 Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14 (establishing the fair notice test for FLSA complaints); Rosenfield, 
811 F.3d at 286 (adopting Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.’s test). The Ninth 
Circuit had not previously considered nor applied the manager rule, and questioned whether there 
was in fact a real difference between the rule as applied in the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits 
and the Kasten fair notice test. Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 287. Believing the two approaches to be likely 
consistent, the Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary to definitively decide this issue because the Su-
preme Court opinion as to what constitutes a protected FLSA complaint controlled. Id. 
 73 Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14. The Supreme Court’s fair notice test stated “a complaint must be 
sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and 
context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection.” Id. 
 74 See Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 287 (situating the manager rule within fair notice analysis on 
the assumption that managers’ responsibilities affect the recognition of their actions as FLSA 
complaints). 
 75 Id. at 286. The Ninth Circuit specifically recognized that identical reports about wage and 
hour issues would be understood differently if made by an entry-level employee versus a manager 
responsible for FLSA compliance; the entry-level employee’s report would “almost certainly” be 
recognized as a protected complaint but the manager’s report would be seen as part of her regular 
work duties. Id. 
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concerns as a complaint: she would just be fulfilling her duty to the compa-
ny.76 The Ninth Circuit noted the Kasten Court’s concern that the FLSA be 
implemented in a broadly remedial fashion to satisfy the statute’s basic 
ameliorative purpose in a way that remains fair to employers, and viewed 
their fair notice test as the defining requirement for any protected com-
plaint.77 The court therefore held that whether there was fair notice to estab-
lish a protected complaint required a case-by-case analysis, including eval-
uation of the employee’s actual responsibilities, because the Kasten rule 
calls for consideration of the content and context of a specific alleged FLSA 
complaint.78 An employee’s role as a manager was an important factor with-
in the context deliberation, but not the only consideration.79 
Because FLSA compliance was not within Ms. Rosenfield’s responsi-
bilities, the court held that her repeated statements about violations could 
reasonably be interpreted by a jury as protected complaints under the anti-
retaliation provision.80 It was not proper to say that Ms. Rosenfield’s em-
ployer reasonably understood her actions as just part of her job—the evi-
dence was sufficient for GlobalTranz to have fair notice that her actions 
were a protected complaint.81 The court thus reversed the lower court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of GlobalTranz and remanded the case 
for further proceedings.82  
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 287–88 (determining that fair notice required a case-by-case analysis). 
 79 Id. at 286 (refusing to consider employee status as the only part of context). The Ninth 
Circuit expressed concern that a binary application of manager status, rather than consideration of 
the manager role as part of the context of a purported complaint, could render the analysis insuffi-
ciently sensitive to the differences between first-line managers and higher-level managers. Id. at 
287–88. The suggestion is that lower-level managers may receive greater protections than higher-
level managers under the anti-retaliation provision. See id. Though the district court found that all 
of Ms. Rosenfield’s actions to report FLSA compliance issues were within her managerial duties, 
the Ninth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find her actions sufficient to be recognized by 
her employer as a protected complaint because her duties specifically did not include FLSA com-
pliance. Id. at 288. The Ninth Circuit did not acknowledge a distinction between its conclusion 
and the district court’s other than to note the general duties of a manager versus Ms. Rosenfield’s 
actual duties, implying that the difference in their ultimate conclusion was based on their accurate 
application of the Kasten fair notice test as compared to the district court’s lack of contextual 
consideration. See id. (discussing the district court’s summary judgment decision and applying the 
Kasten fair notice test to Ms. Rosenfield’s version of the facts on review); see also Rosenfield v. 
GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-02327-PHX-NVW, 2012 WL 12538605 at *2 (D. Ariz. 
Nov. 7, 2012). 
 80 Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 284 (finding plaintiff’s actions could be considered fair notice). 
 81 Id. at 288 (finding plaintiff’s actions outside her responsibilities). The district court’s grant 
of summary judgment in GlobalTranz’s favor meant that the Ninth Circuit had to accept Ms. 
Rosenfield’s view of the facts. Id. Despite holding the positions of Manager and Director of Hu-
man Resources, Ms. Rosenfield was adamant that FLSA compliance was not within her purview 
and she was not expected to ensure or even comment upon potential FLSA issues. Id. 
 82 Id. at 288–89 (remanding for consideration of fair notice). The Supreme Court denied 
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The majority decision in Rosenfield presents the first decision of a U.S. 
Court of Appeals to address the question of whether an employee with man-
agerial responsibilities undertook protected activity under the FLSA by con-
sidering only whether the employer had fair notice the employee was mak-
ing a complaint under the FLSA.83 This approach departed from decisions 
previously made by other circuits.84 
The Rosenfield approach simplified matters by embracing one legal test 
for whether an employee’s complaint constitutes protected activity, putting 
aside the manager rule requiring different analytical approaches based on role 
previously used by other circuits.85 The court disclaimed decision on whether 
the manager rule was different from or inconsistent with Kasten’s fair notice 
rule, and claimed only to be applying the newly issued controlling prece-
dent.86 By stating that an employee’s role as a manager is just one part of the 
                                                                                                                           
GlobalTranz’s petition for certiorari. GlobalTranz, Inc. v. Rosenfield, 137 S. Ct. 85 (Oct. 3, 2016) 
(denial of petition for certiorari). 
 83 See Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 287 (considering that the fair notice test and the manager rule 
are likely not inconsistent with one another and finding that the fair notice test as Supreme Court 
opinion controls). Compare Alex B. Long, Employment Retaliation and the Accident of Text, 90 
OR. L. REV. 525, 557–58 (2011) (finding that the Kasten fair notice test is consistent with the 
manager rule because it arguably requires adverse action to put an employer on notice that a com-
plaint has been filed), with Sanchez & Klausner, supra note 4, § 3:15 (identifying a circuit split 
based on the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of Kasten fair notice rather than the manager rule). The 
manager rule was developed by the Tenth Circuit and adopted by the First and Fifth Circuits be-
fore the Supreme Court established the Kasten fair notice test. See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14 (estab-
lishing the fair notice test for FLSA complaints); Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 
617, 627–28 (5th Cir. 2008) (adopting the manager rule); Claudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickinson 
Caribe Ltd., 375 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2004) (same); McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 
1486–87 (10th Cir. 1996) (establishing the manager rule). A few months after Kasten’s establish-
ment of the fair notice test, the Sixth Circuit decided a case on the grounds that FLSA complaints 
made during the performance of assigned human resources responsibilities did not constitute pro-
tected activity. See Pettit v. Steppingstone, Ctr. for the Potentially Gifted, 429 F. App’x 524, 530 
n.2 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that various Sixth Circuit district courts as well as the First, Fifth, and 
Tenth Circuits had held that complaints were only protected when outside the employee’s usual 
responsibilities). Post-Kasten, district courts in various circuits continued to assume the validity of 
the manager rule. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ready Pac Produce, No. 13-cv-4634, 2014 WL 1875261, 
at *7 (D.N.J. May 9, 2014) (using McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc.’s “stepping outside the role” lan-
guage to define protected activity); Southard v. City of Orongo, No. 12-cv-5027, 2013 WL 
352999, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 2013) (considering the manager rule’s “stepping outside the 
role” requirements and finding plaintiff had stepped outside her role); Mousavi v. Parkside Obstet-
rics, Gynecology & Infertility, S.C., No. 10-cv-4765, 2011 WL 3610080, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 
2011) (applying the manager rule). 
 84 See Hagan, 529 F.3d at 627–28 (adopting the manager rule); Claudio-Gotay, 375 F.3d at 
102 (same). Compare Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 287 (holding that the fair notice rule controlled), 
with McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486–87 (holding that a manager must step outside the managerial role 
to file a protected complaint).  
 85 See Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 287 (holding that fair notice rule controlled); Pettit, 429 
F. App’x at 530 n.2 (adopting manager rule); Hagan, 529 F.3d at 627–28 (same); Claudio-Gotay, 
325 F.3d at 102 (same); McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486–87 (same). 
 86 Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 287 (discussing the interplay between fair notice and the manager 
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context that must be evaluated, however, the Ninth Circuit effectively rejected 
the position that a manager’s actions are only protected under the FLSA when 
the employee steps outside the managerial role to file a complaint.87 
B. Judge Benson Dissents in Favor of Preserving the Manager Rule 
Judge Benson dissented from the Ninth Circuit’s decision that Kasten’s 
fair notice rule controlled the issue of whether a manager’s complaint en-
joyed protection under the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.88 He argued 
that because Kasten only addressed whether an oral complaint met the 
statutory definition of filing a complaint, the Supreme Court had not given 
guidance as to what fair notice looked like when evaluating an alleged 
complaint by a manager.89 Judge Benson argued that, absent any showing 
that Ms. Rosenfield had stepped outside of her managerial role and taken a 
position adverse to her employer, the grant of summary judgment to Glob-
alTranz should be affirmed under the manager rule.90 To do away with the 
manager rule, in his opinion, would grant more protection to upper man-
agement than to the lower-level employees that the FLSA was primarily 
designed to protect.91 
                                                                                                                           
rule). The Ninth Circuit suggested that the manager rule and the fair notice test are likely con-
sistent with one another, while both deliberately declining to decide this definitively and refusing 
to declare or adopt a formal rule for evaluating managerial behavior under the anti-retaliation 
provision. Id. at 284, 287; see Long, supra note 83, at 557–58 (finding the arguable adverse action 
requirement of the Kasten fair notice test consistent with the manager rule); Erin M. Snider, Note, 
The FLSA Antiretaliation Provision: Defining the Outer Contours of What Constitutes an Employ-
ee Complaint, 96 IOWA L. REV. 385, 407 (2010) (explaining the McKenzie formulation of the 
manager rule as consistent with a fair notice test and advocating for case-by-case evaluation of 
notice). 
 87 See Hagan, 529 F.3d at 627–28 (adopting the manager rule); Claudio-Gotay, 375 F.3d at 
102 (same). Compare Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 287 (holding that the fair notice rule controlled), 
with McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486–87 (holding that a manager must step outside the managerial role 
to file a protected complaint), and Sanchez & Klausner, supra note 4, § 3:15 (identifying a circuit 
split based on the Ninth Circuit’s holding that managers are protected from FLSA retaliation when 
employers have fair notice that something is a complaint). 
 88 Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 289–90 (Benson, J., dissenting) (dissenting from adoption of fair 
notice rule). 
 89 Id. at 290 (arguing a lack of proper guidance for fair notice). 
 90 Id. at 291–92 (arguing that “stepping outside” the managerial role was still required be-
cause the FLSA’s “filed any complaint” language implies an adversarial process and Kasten’s fair 
notice test did not support doing away with the distinction for complaints issued by managers). 
 91 Id. at 291 (arguing that the manager rule was necessary to maintain the FLSA’s calibration 
of protection between employers, managers, and rank-and-file employees). Judge Benson read 
Kasten to require non-managerial employees to step outside their roles and assert adverse action to 
trigger anti-retaliation protection, and viewed the majority’s opinion as allowing protection for 
managers without this adverse action requirement, thereby increasing managerial protection while 
decreasing non-managerial protection contrary to the FLSA’s purpose. Id. 
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III. SOME MANAGERIAL PROTECTION IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FLSA 
The different approaches to determining whether a managerial em-
ployee’s actions constitute protected activity under the FLSA highlight the 
major tension between the statute’s purpose, language, enforcement practic-
es, and judicial interpretations of protected activity.92 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 decision in Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz En-
terprises, Inc. brings these issues to the forefront, calling attention to the 
underlying policy question about the extent to which the FLSA protects 
managers.93 This Part addresses the historical reasons for the FLSA’s lack of 
managerial protection, but argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision to use a 
fair notice test rather than the manager rule is an important step toward en-
suring that the FLSA’s wage and hour requirements are enforceable.94  
The choice to exempt managerial work from FLSA protection for 
wage and hour matters can be traced to the statute’s original purpose to pro-
tect common workers.95 Historically, managers have had more power and 
authority than common workers.96 This context is built into the statute’s 
language via the explicit exemption of employees with managerial duties 
from its wage and hour protection.97 It is thus not unreasonable to expect 
that the FLSA might address those employees differently in its anti-
retaliation protections.98  
                                                                                                                           
 92 See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012) (establishing retaliation protection when employees file 
complaints); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 11 (2011) (discuss-
ing the importance of employee-provided information to the FLSA’s enforcement); Rosenfield v. 
GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., 811 F.3d 282, 287 (9th Cir. 2015) (treating managerial responsibilities 
as part but not all of the context of a complaint); McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 
1486–87 (10th Cir. 1996) (requiring managerial employees to assert adverse action against their 
employers to receive anti-retaliation protection under the FLSA). 
 93 See Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 286 (noting that the same comments by managerial and non-
managerial employees may not be recognized equally as a protected complaint). 
 94 See infra notes 95–133 and accompanying text. 
 95 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (establishing protections for certain employees); Grossman, 
supra note 1, at 25–26 (discussing the severe labor issues of the 1930s and President Roosevelt’s 
goal of offering protection to children and the poorest workers); Miller, supra note 26, at 32–33 
(discussing the conception of exempted white-collar employees in the 1930s as a small, exclusive 
group of highly compensated employees at the top of a corporate structure compared to the mod-
ern reality of front-line and mid-level managers who may earn less than unionized factory em-
ployees). 
 96 See Grossman, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing an employer’s power over employees). 
 97 See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (exempting certain employees from FLSA protection); Miller, 
supra note 26, at 32 (noting that white-collar employees in the 1930s were an exclusive group of 
mostly top-level executives and administrators not then subject to the struggles facing blue-collar 
workers). 
 98 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (establishing protections for certain employees); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 541.100 (2016) (exempting professional employees from FLSA protection); Oberti, supra note 
38, at 45–46 (discussing the need to maintain a viable system of at-will employment by preventing 
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The FLSA offers protection to workers only when it is enforced.99 If an 
employer is not in compliance and no one within the company complains, 
there is little chance that the government’s independent enforcement mech-
anisms will catch it: there are simply too many employers for comprehen-
sive direct monitoring of every employer subject to the FLSA.100 Internal 
regulation is thus critical to the FLSA’s effectiveness.101 Because the FLSA 
relies so heavily on employees’ willingness to bring complaints, it seems 
illogical that the very employees charged with monitoring wage and hour 
issues are not granted the anti-retaliation protections offered to others.102 
The original purpose for the FLSA’s enactment was to protect workers 
who were often uneducated; workers who see a manager with FLSA re-
sponsibilities fired for reporting a wage or hour grievance are likely una-
ware that their direct complaints to any level of management or the De-
partment of Labor would have greater legal protections.103 The anti-
                                                                                                                           
all managerial reporting from becoming protected activity as the basis for the manager rule). Until 
relatively recently, “professional” employees constituted approximately 3% of the U.S. workforce; 
by 2008, that percentage was expected to increase to over 15%. Miller, supra note 26, at 34, 36. 
Despite the disparate treatment of complaints brought by managers in several circuits, the De-
partment of Labor’s website states that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation protection applies to all em-
ployees, even when the employee’s work is not covered by the FLSA. See Wage and Hour Divi-
sion—Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs77a.
htm [https://perma.cc/GNM5-CUXY] (explaining the anti-retaliation protection provision). 
 99 See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 11 (discussing the importance of employee-provided information to 
FLSA enforcement); Barclay-Strobel, supra note 26, at 552 (discussing the emphasis on the im-
portance of employee reporting to FLSA compliance by both the Supreme Court and lower 
courts). 
 100 See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 11 (noting the reliance of FLSA enforcement on employee-
provided information); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (not-
ing Congress’s purposeful decision not to create a detailed oversight regime for FLSA enforce-
ment); J. Bradley Medaris, Wage and Hour Myths: Illuminating the Truth Behind Misconceptions 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 72 ALA. LAW. 462, 463–64 (2011) (discussing the widespread 
frequency of FLSA violations); Miller, supra note 26, at 31 (noting the number of DOL investiga-
tors). 
 101 See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1007 (9th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that it is normal for 
employees to seek internal solutions before escalating to external procedures); Valerio v. Putnam 
Assoc. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing benefits of internal procedures); Bodie, supra 
note 51, at 162 (discussing the need for self-regulation across employment law in general to assist in 
enforcement). 
 102 See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 11 (acknowledging the importance of employee-provided infor-
mation to FLSA enforcement); Barclay-Strobel, supra note 26, at 526 (noting enforcement diffi-
culties that result from not protecting employees charged with FLSA compliance); Clemons, su-
pra note 2, at 555 (discussing how confusion about FLSA rights undermines the FLSA’s goal of 
enforcement through employee reporting). 
 103 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219; Kasten, 563 U.S. at 12 (noting that the employees most in need 
of statutory protection were often those who were least educated); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 
121, 124 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that the importance of the anti-retaliation provision was the elimi-
nation of the fear of economic reprisal); Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, H.R. Doc. 
No. 75-255, at 4 (1937) (calling for Congress to enact legislation protecting common workers, 
particularly in factories and on farms); see also Barclay-Strobel, supra note 26, at 587 (discussing 
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retaliation provision is meant to eliminate the fear of economic retaliation 
that an employee might otherwise face for notifying an employer of a wage 
or hour grievance.104 If the employees tasked with internal FLSA compli-
ance are not similarly protected from economic retaliation for ensuring this 
compliance, the anti-retaliation provision is unlikely to offer much comfort 
to non-managerial employees.105 The anti-retaliation provision’s power to 
enhance FLSA compliance is therefore seriously undermined when it refus-
es protection to managerial employees with wage and hour monitoring re-
sponsibilities.106 
This raises an issue acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit in Rosenfield: 
whether there are disparate protections when managerial and non-managerial 
employees raise the same FLSA concern.107 Ms. Rosenfield was fired after 
reporting FLSA violations that she discovered when sent to investigate em-
ployee concerns.108 Applying the manager rule and a traditional concept of a 
human resource director’s responsibilities, her activities would not be pro-
tected; passing along the employees’ complaints would be within the pur-
view of her employment.109 Rather than constituting adverse action, raising 
a liability alert would protect her employer’s interests.110 Ms. Rosenfield 
would be required to show that her actual duties did not include FLSA 
                                                                                                                           
the natural reluctance of employees to pursue FLSA complaints if they see their managers fired 
for doing the same); Snider, supra note 86, at 404 (discussing the chilling effect that witnessing 
unpunished retaliation against employees who raise FLSA complaints could have because of the 
role of workplace norms in setting employees’ perceptions of legal action). 
 104 See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292 (stating that the purpose of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provi-
sion was to further enforcement by eliminating fear of economic retaliation against complaints); 
Brock, 812 F.2d at 124 (addressing the enforcement roadblock presented by reliance on employee 
complaints if raising them risks economic stability and therefore finding retaliation based on an 
employer’s mistaken belief that an employee engaged in protected activity was not outside the 
FLSA’s scope of protection); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 915.004, EEOC EN-
FORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON RETALIATION AND RELATED ISSUES (2016) (discussing the depend-
ence of federal employment discrimination laws on employee willingness to challenge discrimina-
tion without fear of punishment). 
 105 See Brock, 812 F.2d at 124 (noting the importance of eliminating economic retaliation 
fears as a barrier to employee reporting of FLSA grievances). 
 106 See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); Kasten, 563 U.S. at 11–12 (discussing the importance of the 
anti-retaliation provision to effective FLSA enforcement); Barclay-Strobel, supra note 26, at 526 
(addressing the undercutting effect of not protecting employees with FLSA compliance duties). 
 107 See Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 286 (acknowledging that the same comments by managerial 
and non-managerial employees may be differently recognized as protected complaints). 
 108 Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 56, at 9–10. 
 109 See Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 288 (noting that most human resources directors are responsi-
ble for FLSA compliance issues); McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1487 (requiring a manager to step outside 
that role in order to file a protected complaint). 
 110 See McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486 (noting that a manager is usually protecting the employer 
from liability when raising an alert about FLSA issues); Brake, supra note 3, at 8 (discussing how 
employees’ compliance responsibilities are intended to raise issues to further their employers’ 
interests). 
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compliance to prove she stepped outside her managerial role in reporting 
concerns.111 She might still struggle to establish adverse action, however, 
because it is presumably better for a company to address FLSA violations 
preemptively, before external complaints or litigation arise.112 Had the call 
center employees raised their wage and hour concerns directly with Ms. 
Rosenfield’s supervisors, their actions would be protected under the 
FLSA.113 For a statute dependent on employee complaints for effective en-
forcement, refusing protection to those employees tasked with ensuring 
compliance is a confusing policy decision that undermines the basic idea of 
enforcement based on internal self-regulation.114 
Judicial interpretation of protected activity compounds this enforce-
ment challenge.115 In focusing on forcing managerial employees to step out-
side their roles and take action that is adverse to the employer, the First, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits may have put an undue burden on a manag-
er’s ability to raise FLSA concerns without escalating immediately to an 
external complaint to the Department of Labor.116 If a manager’s duties in-
volve FLSA wage and hour issues, then raising concerns about FLSA com-
pliance is necessarily in the employer’s interest because it heads off poten-
tial litigation by the affected employees.117 Where there are valid FLSA 
concerns, it seems unreasonable that a manager tasked with compliance 
should have to take such aggressive action against their employer or risk 
                                                                                                                           
 111 First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, at 5 (discussing plaintiff’s job responsibilities); 
see Claudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickinson Caribe, Ltd., 365 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding no 
protection where actions were within plaintiff’s job responsibilities). 
 112 First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, at 5 (discussing plaintiff’s job responsibilities); see 
Claudio-Gotay, 365 F.3d at 103 (finding plaintiff’s actions in the company’s best interest); Brake, 
supra note 3, at 8 (discussing an employer’s interest in maintaining compliance procedures). 
 113 Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 56, at 8–9 (discussing the facts of the case); see 
Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 286 (acknowledging disparate protections for different employees based 
on the employer’s ability to recognize action as a protected FLSA complaint). 
 114 See Barclay-Strobel, supra note 26, at 526 (noting that refusing protection to employees 
tasked with monitoring FLSA compliance undercuts enforcement efforts). 
115 See, e.g., McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1487 (evaluating whether activity was adverse to employer). 
 116 See, e.g., Valerio, 173 F.3d at 43 (noting that disallowing internal complaints under the 
anti-retaliation provision would discourage employees from attempting to resolve issues internally 
and require immediate escalation). Should managerial employees with FLSA compliance respon-
sibilities suspect that upper management would be unreceptive to FLSA concerns, the manager 
rule forces them to decide whether to risk their jobs by proceeding internally or complicate their 
workplace relationships by going directly to court or the Department of Labor. See Rosenfield, 811 
F.3d at 286 (discussing the different actions necessary for managerial and non-managerial em-
ployees to establish protected complaints); Barclay-Strobel, supra note 26, at 557 (discussing how 
a lack of protection for complaints within an HR manager’s duties undermines FLSA enforcement 
by requiring those employees to take calculated risks when making complaints); Brake, supra note 
3, at 8 (discussing the difficulties of advocating for compliance issues while maintaining a cooper-
ative working relationship with upper management). 
 117 See McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1487 (stating that managerial concerns about FLSA violations 
are not adverse action against an employer). 
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significant consequences.118 This adverse action requirement almost inevi-
tably creates a chilling effect that is directly detrimental to actual enforce-
ment of the FLSA.119 
It is possible to view the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s 
adverse assertion of rights requirement in the manager rule as focused on 
concern about an employer’s ability to recognize protected activity.120 The 
stated policy concern behind the manager rule is that so much managerial 
behavior could constitute protected activity that fear of FLSA litigation 
would prevent valid employment decisions to fire or demote managerial 
employees.121 To some extent, this is a manifestation of the concern over 
lack of notice.122 Because it is contrary to the concept of at-will employ-
ment to deem the majority of an employee’s responsibilities statutorily pro-
tected from retaliation, it is not reasonable to say that all comments about 
FLSA issues are protected complaints.123  
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to put aside the specific adverse action 
requirement for managerial employees in favor of the Supreme Court’s fair 
                                                                                                                           
 118 See Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 286 (acknowledging that the same complaint made by a non-
managerial employee would be recognized as protected under the anti-retaliation provision); 
Brake, supra note 3, at 33 (discussing the slim line between stepping outside the managerial role 
to assert adverse action and insubordination). 
 119 See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 11–12 (discussing the importance of the anti-retaliation provision 
to effective FLSA enforcement); McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486–87 (discussing the need for a mana-
gerial employee to assert adverse action against the employer for behavior to be protected under 
the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA). 
 120 See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14 (holding that an employer’s reasonable ability to recognize a 
complaint as such is key); Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 287 (applying the Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Per-
formance Plastics Corp.’s fair notice test to managerial as well as non-managerial employees); 
McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1487 (requiring adverse action against an employer by a managerial em-
ployee); Clemons, supra note 2, at 546 (noting that the adverse action requirement is focused on 
the employer’s ability to distinguish protected from non-protected managerial activity). 
 121 See Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 628 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting concerns 
about ramifications of FLSA protection to at-will employment). Though the court in McKenzie v. 
Renberg’s Inc. made no reference to policy in establishing the manager rule, the court’s rationale in 
Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C. likely reflects their underlying concerns. See Barclay-Strobel, 
supra note 26, at 533 (discussing the lack of textual reliance in decisions adopting the manager rule 
in lieu of a focus on practical justifications). 
 122 See Hagan, 529 F.3d at 628 (fearing a lack of distinction between protected and regular 
managerial activity). The cases applying the manager rule suggest a deep concern for distinguish-
ing normal managerial behavior from action rising to the level of a protected complaint. See 
Clemons, supra note 2, at 546 (noting the focus of the adverse action requirement on an employ-
er’s ability to distinguish protected managerial activity); Snider, supra note 86, at 407 (discussing 
the consistency of the McKenzie formulation with a fair notice test and advocating for case-by-
case evaluation of notice). 
 123 See Hagan, 529 F.3d at 628 (stating concerns for rampant litigation in otherwise at-will 
employment as a result of over-protection of employee actions); Lambert, 180 F.3d at 1007 (not-
ing that an employee must actually make a complaint to receive FLSA retaliation protection); 
Brake, supra note 3, at 34 (discussing the fundamental conflict between retaliation protection and 
at-will employment that compromises employment discrimination complaint procedures). 
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notice test takes some steps to address this concern.124 If managers are not 
required to step outside their roles to undertake FLSA-protected activity, 
then whether the employer has fair notice that an action is a complaint is 
necessarily more important than whether the employee acted within their 
duties.125 The Supreme Court in Kasten and the Ninth Circuit in Rosenfield 
both held that the phrasing “filed any complaint” suggested a broad inter-
pretation of a complaint; it seems unreasonable to exclude managerial ac-
tions from this.126 
It is reasonable to be concerned with distinguishing actual FLSA com-
plaints from routine comments within an employee’s regular portfolio of 
responsibilities.127 The dual context and content elements of the fair notice 
test, however, should provide enough information for a fact finder to make a 
reasonable determination about an employee’s conduct without requiring a 
separate analytical framework for managerial employees.128 There is prece-
dent requiring some formality to establish a recognizable complaint; any 
off-hand remark is not enough to trigger anti-retaliation protection.129 The 
ability of a fact finder to identify true complaints based on content and con-
text seems unlikely to differ dramatically based on employee role.130 It may 
be reasonable to expect more detail before a managerial employee’s com-
ment is a recognizable complaint as compared to the same comment by a 
non-managerial employee.131 Where a non-managerial employee might 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14 (establishing a fair notice test for FLSA complaints); Rosen-
field, 811 F.3d at 287 (adopting fair notice as the test for whether a managerial employee filed a 
protected complaint); McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486–87 (requiring adverse action by a managerial 
employee to establish a protected complaint); Ronald Turner, Title VII, the Third-Party Retalia-
tion Issue, and the “Plain Language” Mirage, 5 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 77, 93 (2013) (discuss-
ing the Kasten Court’s attempt to balance employer and employee interests in the fair notice test). 
 125 See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14 (establishing the employer’s fair notice as the defining re-
quirement for a protected complaint); McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1487 (requiring managerial employees 
to step outside their roles to file protected complaints). 
 126 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012) (providing the language “filed any complaint”); Kasten, 563 
U.S. at 10 (noting the importance of the word “any” within the phrase “filed any complaint”); 
Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 285–86 (accepting the Supreme Court’s broad analysis of “any”); Brake, 
supra note 3, at 22 (discussing how the manager rule can result in total exclusion from retaliation 
protection for employees with compliance responsibilities). 
 127 See Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 287 (adopting Kasten fair notice test for protected behavior). 
 128 See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14 (establishing content and context as the primary elements of 
fair notice for when an employee has filed a protected complaint under the FLSA). 
 129 Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 286 (noting that a complaint must be reasonably recognizable as 
such to the employer to receive protection under the anti-retaliation provision); Lambert, 180 F.3d 
at 1007–08 (stating that an actual complaint of some sort must be made to trigger the anti-
retaliation provision, and discussing without defining factors to consider in determining whether 
an action constitutes a complaint). 
 130 See Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 287 (noting the requirement to conduct fair notice analysis on 
a case-by-case basis).  
131 See Lambert, 180 F.3d at 1007–08 (noting elements that made an employee’s letter defini-
tively a complaint and also addressing elements not necessarily required in a complaint). 
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make a recognizable complaint without specific reference to the FLSA pro-
vision at issue, it may be reasonable to expect a managerial employee with 
FLSA responsibilities to identify a specific violation.132 Applying the con-
tent and context elements this way would promote enforcement of the 
FLSA by the employees responsible for internal compliance, without requir-
ing immediate escalation to external complaints to establish anti-retaliation 
protection through adverse action.133  
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rosen-
field v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc. to consider fair notice the applicable 
test for whether both managerial and non-managerial employees conducted 
protected activity under the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA was a 
positive step for enhanced enforcement of the Act. Eliminating a separate 
track of analysis for managerial behavior and considering instead whether 
the content and context of a complaint suffice to give fair notice to the em-
ployer is in keeping with the statute’s broad remedial purpose. The Ninth 
Circuit fails, however, to go quite far enough to satisfy this purpose. Given 
that the FLSA relies so heavily on employee-reported complaints for en-
forcement, refusing to provide protection to those employees actually 
charged with internal FLSA compliance likely undermines the statute’s ac-
tual effectiveness.  
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 132 See id. (noting differences between the protections afforded different employees). 
 133 See id. (discussing the varying levels of protection offered to employees with different 
roles). 
